Greenland - Not Over Yet!

Following Our Recent Review Articles on Venezuela and Ukraine ...

The politics of Davos were somewhat chaotic. We suspect that most mainstream commentators missed what was actually going on in their rather obvious attempt to claim victory for ‘the world’ and a defeat for Trump. How the old and new orders claim victory and defeat is an essay in the incommensurate - the first seem to think it a victory merely to have survived intact whereas the latter sees each fight as simply a stage in a long-running negotiation where it believes it holds all the cards. For the latter everything is two steps forward and one step back in a remorseless drive to test power to the limits. After Greenland and Venezuela, it looks as if Trump is attempting the same trick with Iran while Ukraine sits in the query basket as Zelensky weighs up his limited options. Let us try a different interpretation of the situation and then take a look at the implications for Europe of the recently published US National Defense Strategy because the latter is intimately related to all three of the crises we have explored this month - Venezuela, Ukraine and Greenland.

The European media spoke of a ‘climbdown’ by Trump but this is not how Washington sees things. It sees the threats of force and tariffs as a negotiating ploy that has demonstrated European fragmentation and forced the rest of NATO into taking the US’ concerns seriously. There are two issues for Washington – the first is the blind spot in US national missile defence represented by Greenland where it is nervous of its defensive arrangements being under another sovereign authority and the second is the mineral resource of the island which a) is not being utilised because of a weak approach (as it sees it) of Denmark that will not allow capital in to explore and exploit and where b) the fear is that circumstances might see Chinese or future European investment control of such strategic assets emerge to the detriment of the US.

The terms of a negotiation are set …

Trump does not really care what Europeans ‘think’. He knows that most Europeans are desperate to retain US security guarantees (and even extend them to include Ukraine) at this point in history. The view in Washington is cynical – that the few days in the run-up to Davos saw a form of hysteria take place across Europe which left Trump able to walk into Davos and draw back from his maximalist position on the basis that force and trade tariffs as well as withdrawal from NATO had been placed on the table if Washington’s ultimate requirements were not satisfied. Now it is time to negotiate to meet those requirements under conditions where a tariff war is not desired by anyone but would almost certainly be more of a problem for Europe than the US. In Washington’s view, Europe (and notably Denmark) has received sufficient shock to draw it into the net of a framework that has already begun to be discussed and where the UK and NATO (insttutionally) can be expected to act as ‘persuaders’.

The British were getting quite excited that their ‘third way’ had brought about an apparent resolution but this nonsense was for domestic consumption. The key call was Rutte’s who fundamentally agreed with Washington’s assessment of its own strategic requirements. He is more concerned (as are many member states) with ensuring the unity of NATO around the alleged Russian threat as priority. He and they want Washington to get in line over Ukraine rather than squabble over Greenland. The UK is also terrified of a breach with Washington. Its entire foreign and defence structure is predicated on the maintenance of NATO where (at least for a long period, despite French aspirations) the transformation of Europe into a military power is going to require the US strategic umbrella. The relative silence of Germany in all this was noticeable.

We have, of course, no idea of the precise nature of the ‘framework’ for a settlement. Everything has gone rather quiet since the furore. The Danes are probably already being diplomatically pressured by NATO and close allies (UK) but one idea has been floated already and one other is reasonably probable. The first idea is that the US be given ‘sovereign bases’ (like that of the UK on Cyprus). This would be a negotiated extension of imperial power designed to maintain strategic force. In the UK case, these anomalies are left over from withdrawal from empire. It is indicative that Trump repeated his criticism of British withdrawal from the Chagos Islands as if he was valuing sovereign bases intrinsically in a rather ‘imperialist’ definition of the nature of sovereign power. The other possible idea may be a new treaty of mineral exploitation that cuts out non-Western powers, privileges US corporations and perhaps permits some leavings for face-saving purposes to the corporate interests and banks of the European Union. Environmentalist concerns would have to be dropped which will be difficult for the Danes and, indeed, for many centrist Europeans trying to keep Green sentiment on board with their various domestic agenda.

Expect US determination to get its way …

The bottom line is that the US does not trust NATO to deliver American security but will continue to support European security so long as Europeans understand that the US Administration places its own security first. More on this and the US National Defense Strategy below. To Washington, Ukraine is secondary. Tariffs are just another tool in the tool kit. Allies are not friends but simply countries you do business with. The ‘framework’ might allow civilian Greenland to remain part of the sovereign Danish Empire but with a loss of Danish sovereignty over whatever base territories Washington thinks it needs to maintain its missile defence. Exactly who then polices the Northern Approaches in a maritime context (probably NATO at its collective expense) is up for grabs while pressure is placed on Denmark to open up the island to strategic minerals exploitation on American terms. We are already seeing a trial run of the new imperial approach in the opening up of the Venezuelan energy sector to US capital.

After what amounts to a circus with a lot of hissy-fighting on all sides, where we are is that a negotiation has started. The US will want what it wants and may well accept whatever face-saving formulae are required in Europe so long as the core of its needs are met – as we say, probably those sovereign bases specifically linked to national rather than international security, higher non-US NATO expenditures on the security of the Northern Approaches and secure and rapid access to island mineral resources. If Washington does not get this outcome, then tariffs, the future of the alliance and even military force go back on the agenda with some Europeans wanting (or pretending to want) to ‘fight’ and others terrified of the consequences of doing so.

The next stage is like that of Ukraine – a Washington-driven set of demands presented to a fragmented Europe that is going to have to come up with a coherent fight or flight response rather than stand hysterically still. The primary decision will still be that of Denmark which will be under quadruple pressure from Washington, various European positions (which may take time to cohere), the Danish electorate and the opinions of Greenlanders. Rutte at NATO will thus play a major role in trying to square this circle but Washington will be impatient to see the issue resolved relatively quickly – not in weeks perhaps but in months rather than years. Within this time frame (as with Ukraine, Gaza, Venezuela and Iran), Washington will be persistent and assertive, making it clear that it has a ‘big stick’ (actually three) to use if necessary.

But why the impatience?

Our best guess is that the Congressionals are central to the time-scale. This, in practice, means a resolution of this and other crises in ways that make the Administration look strong between June and October. Trump is already recalibrating on the internal crisis in Minnesota on the one step back, two steps forward principle. We might expect a similar performance in his difficult relationship with the Federal Reserve. Trump does not need to win all of his victories but only sufficient to show both strength and some notion of benefit for ordinary Americans in terms of security or (more importantly) the cost of living.

The verbal attack on Norway, for example, is perhaps not quite so irrational as it appears in this context. His style might be judged absurd but we always have to ask what is being aimed at in each case of stylistic absurdity. The claim that Norway has no influence on the Nobel Peace Prize is a little naïve given informal cultural rather than formal administrative norms. Nominations close this month and the result will be announced in October (just before the Congressionals). The Prize has become (perhaps ridiculously) a test of European ‘gratitude’ not for Trump but for the human and financial sacrifice of America in the Second World War and Cold War. He might not get it (indeed, it will probably be more politically difficult for the Nobel Committee to give it than not) but he can use it politically in order to use ‘ingratitude’ as a tool in another decision entirely - the level of strategic commitment to Europe - or, equally, just brush it off if that suits him more.

Of course, most Europeans do not see it this way, a good proportion of whom were rather ambivalent about being liberated from fascism and most of those who are not thought a) they had liberated themselves (as in Norway) or b) were not liberated from the Russians by the Americans at all. However, the MAGA pitch (which was explicit in Trump’s speech and will have been heard back home) is that the US has been weakened and exploited by allies in recent decades as poor recompense for its past sacrifice and tax dollars. More sophisticated critics would point to the Soviet collapse owing a great deal to the draining cost of maintaining an occupation empire and fear a similar trajectory for the American Empire. Trump is simply saying that the age of imperial support for the wider West is coming to an end because of domestic requirements but he is running out of time to show American voters that this withdrawal is necessary and beneficial.

In short, strip away the hysteria and negative analyses as well as the claims of all sides about victories and climbdowns and the Greenland crisis has not actually gone away. The US has not changed its ‘war aims’ any more than Putin has done in Ukraine. In both cases, the war aims are incommensurate with European ideology and policies but the potential strength of Europe to resist the two powers in their respective demands is limited for internal reasons. What now happens is (as in Ukraine) a tortuous negotiation where the underlying tensions will eventually re-emerge. It may be a matter of sovereign bases and US exploitation of the island’s geology or a return to confrontation. Those who are committed to the Atlantic Alliance will be working hard to create the right formula that placates Washington (which is what Washington has been driving towards) while others will be enraged at the potential for humiliation and think Washington can and should be challenged.

The US National Defense Strategy

This brings us to the US National Defense Strategy whose publication followed both the Greenland crisis and an earlier general strategic paper that was rather stunning in its simplicity and coherence. Early on, the National Defense Strategy lays down the law: “Meanwhile in Europe, where President Trump had previously led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to begin taking their defenses seriously, the last administration effectively encouraged them to free-ride, leaving the Alliance unable to deter or respond effectively to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.” It continues: “Russia will remain a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members for the foreseeable future. Indeed, although Russia suffers from a variety of demographic and economic difficulties, its ongoing war in Ukraine shows that it still retains deep reservoirs of military and industrial power. Russia has also shown that it has the national resolve required to sustain a protracted war in its near abroad. In addition, although the Russian military threat is primarily focused on Eastern Europe, Russia also possesses the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, which it continues to modernize and diversify, as well as undersea, space, and cyber capabilities that it could employ against the U.S. Homeland.”

Note the implication of this that a strategic agreement between the US and Russia regarding the nuclear armaments and other strategic issues would mean that the US could cease to have an interest in containing Russia and might regard Russia as merely a European issue. Such an agreement is almost certainly on Washington and Moscow’s medium term agenda and may even have been discussed in Alaska. Note also the review of Russian capacity which effectively undermines the position of the NATO allies to the effect that NATO persistence can degrade Russia into compliance with Western demands while reminding us all of the elephant in the room - the brutal equalising effect of nuclear capacity. The paper will go on to suggest that if Europe is in no position to destroy Russia except at the cost of destroying itself, then Russia is in no position to conquer Europe. The US now undermines much of the paranoia of European ‘war hawks’. The implication is that confrontation is absurd for both sides because neither side can win against the other.

“In light of this, the Department will ensure that U.S. forces are prepared to defend against Russian threats to the U.S. Homeland. The Department will also continue to play a vital role in NATO itself, even as we calibrate U.S. force posture and activities in the European theater to better account for the Russian threat to American interests as well as our allies’ own capabilities. Moscow is in no position to make a bid for European hegemony. European NATO dwarfs Russia in economic scale, population, and, thus, latent military power. At the same time, although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and decreasing share of global economic power. It follows that, although we are and will remain engaged in Europe, we must—and will—prioritize defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China” It adds: “Our NATO allies are therefore strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support. This includes taking the lead in supporting Ukraine’s defense. As President Trump has said, the war in Ukraine must end. As he has also emphasized, however, this is Europe’s responsibility first and foremost.”

The implications …

Nothing could be clearer. The US is preparing to dump Ukraine on Europe (actually on Germany if you look at the context of the paragraph) if there is no Peace Agreement. The hidden message is - ‘you screwed up the Peace by not pressuring Zelensky so the consequences are yours’. Later in the document there is a statement to the effect that Europe is not welcome to dabble outside its own territory and that it needs to concentrate resources on continental defence. In effect, the days when the British and French sought to be global junior partners are over - the sharp comments about the Chagos Islands from Trump show a degree of disdain for first of these. The old empires are now to be dead and buried, almost surplus to requirements as far as the hegemon is concerned.

Russia will interpret this document as meaning that any strategy of aggression in Europe (beyond Ukraine) would be highly foolish, that any strategy of aggression by Europe against Russia is up to the Europeans but it would no longer have the involvement of the US (and the history of Napoleon, the Kaiser and Hitler are perhaps disincentives), that Europe should start building itself up to some sort of credibility before anyone can take it wholly seriously, that US and Russia have no intrinsic reason for confrontation if Russia ceases to present a strategic threat to the US homeland and that Europeans would be rather dumb despite their massive economic superiority to believe they can take out a resilient and vast empire which will eat straw to survive while Europeans are debating how to make their front line troops diverse. Game over for the next three years!

And so back to Greenland. The US message is that it has no intrinsic interest in spending a fortune on defending a continent well placed to defend itself but it also has no interest in Russia actually dominating that continent. As hegemon, it will remain as fall-back position defending Europe from overt aggression. Its unrivalled nuclear, air, naval and missile capacity will be on hand but not American lives. Russia has been shown a red line but so has Europe. However, that ultimate strategic support which is also ultimate deterrence whose operation remains at the risk of the American homeland will come at a high price. Greenland is now part of that pricing mechanism. And Europeans may need to bear in mind that Russia, the US and China may themselves decide to reduce strategic confrontation regardless of European sentiment.